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European market integration and the political economy of corporate
adjustment: OTE and Telecom Italia, 1949–2009
Andreas Kornelakis*
School of Business Management & Economics, Department of Business & Management University
of Sussex, Brighton, UK
Despite the common challenges posed by European market integration and
liberalisation, the behaviour of telecommunications operators across Europe suggests
a variety of modes of adjustment and paths to privatisation. The article examines the
puzzle of divergent responses to liberalisation by OTE and Telecom Italia (TI), casting
light on their distinct paths to privatisation and internationalisation. The cases are
considered in the context of the Varieties of Capitalism frame, which challenges the
perspective that global market integration will lead to convergence in strategies and
structures. Thus, the article suggests that the observed differences are largely explained
by the domestic actors’ preferences, and to a much lesser extent attributed to the
globalising forces of technological change and competition.
Keywords: European Union (EU); liberalisation; telecommunications; privatisation;
Varieties of Capitalism
Introduction
The telecommunications sector in Europe is an excellent test case for arguments pertaining
to convergence and divergence in comparative capitalism. The sector exemplifies the
simultaneous operation of several of the relevant processes that are associated with
globalisation. Telecommunications operators across the globe transformed due to rapid
technological change and this drove reform in the sector.1 The European Union’s (EU)
plan for liberalisation facilitated the exposure of incumbent operators to intense global
competition.2 Although the EU did not require privatisation, several governments sought
to privatise the incumbents to prepare the firms for the new business environment.3
Despite the convergent pressures coming from global technological change and EU-wide
liberalisation, the privatisation paths and the incumbents’ internationalisation strategies
across Europe differed sharply.4 This divergence presents us with an intriguing empirical
puzzle that deserves further analysis and explanation.
The case studies presented here cast some light on this puzzle. The liberalisation
appeared as a common stimulus for both the Greek and the Italian incumbent operators,
however, there were also substantial differences in the mode of the privatisation process,
and the enterprises’ internationalisation strategies. The cases of OTE and Telecom Italia
(TI) are not only relevant to examine the broader question of enterprises’ reactions to
European integration;5 they are also likely to fill a gap in the underdeveloped literature of
firm-level studies from ‘peripheral’ national contexts.6 The research design is comparative
q 2014 Taylor & Francis
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and historical7 and traces the process of change in the regulation, ownership and strategy
of those enterprises. This responds to calls for research that ‘embraces more than one
company/country simultaneously’.8
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. The next section presents an overview of the
convergence/divergence debate in the Varieties of Capitalism framework, and pins down
its relevance by showing how the two country-contexts and company-cases fit into this
frame. The following section elaborates on the particular operation of ‘convergence
pressures’ in the European telecoms industry due to global technological change and EU
regulatory change. Next, the focus shifts towards examining the historical trajectories of
change in the two enterprises: OTE and TI. The historical background matters, because it
allows us to identify path dependencies and explain the enterprises’ behaviour and
reactions to liberalisation through privatisation and internationalisation. The case studies
suggest the plausibility of the argument, that the observed differences in privatisation
paths and internationalisation strategies are attributed to the choices of domestic political-
economic actors.
Varieties of capitalism: between convergence and divergence
The global market integration, fuelled by technological change and intensification of
competition was widely considered as the unstoppable force that could lead to
convergence in institutional structures9 and enterprise strategies.10 The nationally specific
institutional arrangements were expected to converge to the Liberal or Anglo-Saxon
model of capitalism, usually exemplified either by the UK or the US.11 The distinct
features of this model entail the wide application of liberal principles in the organisation of
markets coupled with a reduced role of the state, in terms of ownership and regulation.
Simultaneously, multinational companies were expected to be the main carriers of change,
by adopting similar ‘best practices’ across institutional contexts via their internationalisa-
tion strategies.12
Despite ongoing pressures from globalisation and liberalisation, the comparative
capitalism literature suggested that cross-national institutional diversity persists.13 This
literature brought back a basic insight from Karl Polanyi that all markets are themselves
socially and culturally embedded.14 More particularly, the literature emphasised that
trajectories of change are ‘historically rooted’.15 It also emphasised the role of collective
actors operating within the ‘beneficial constraints’16 of the domestic model of capitalism,
largely held responsible for path-dependent responses to globalisation.17 Thus, these
insights qualified the all-powerful role of structural shifts, including marketisation and
technological change. Instead, the literature claimed that the interplay between agents
and capitalist models mediates common pressures, and shapes institutional structures and
business strategies.18
The article employs the Varieties of Capitalism frame as a heuristic device to shed
light on the differences and commonalities in the two cases. This frame is quite suitable to
make sense of the institutional context in Greece and Italy. Both countries are generally
held to belong to the same model of capitalism dubbed either as ‘State-enhanced
capitalism’,19 ‘Mixed market economies’20 or ‘Mediterranean capitalism’.21 This model
differs from both Liberal Market economies (e.g. the UK) and Coordinated Market
economies (e.g. Germany).22 The corporate actors in state capitalism have an incentive to
invest in ‘political power’ because clientelistic relationships are pervasive.23 Firms
generally follow low-cost strategies, operating in regulated product markets with low
competition; access to funding is bank-based; industry-bank relations are relatively stable,
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while financial markets are underdeveloped.24 Additionally, the role of the state is
historically important and intervenes in all spheres of economic activity,25 whereas it
regularly acts as a ‘compensator of first resort’, while the process of adjustment to
globalisation is dependent on the gate-keeping role of the state.26
The framework suggests that the historical trajectory matters not only for the evolution
of the national institutional context, but also for the firms that operate in those contexts.
As we shall see in the case studies, those general characteristics broadly fit with the
historical background of TI and OTE. Both companies were state-owned, and operated as
monopolies, thus, facing no competition in their domestic markets. Additionally, state
intervention has been significant in shaping their business strategy in the past. The
enterprises’ response to the external shock of liberalisation was path-dependent,
circumscribed into domestic actors’ preferences (namely, government and managers).
Before examining these divergent responses in more detail, the next section turns to the
convergence pressures stemming from the global technological change and EU-wide
liberalisation.
Convergence in EU Telecoms: technological change and liberalisation
The rate of technological change accelerated over the 1980s and 1990s with the advent of
microprocessors. This allowed the application of computing to telecommunications
services, such as the digitisation of switching and transmission of calls. The new methods
of transmission through optical fibre cables and satellites enabled the provision of quicker
and cheaper fixed telephony as well as the provision of new value-added services.27
Additionally, rapid technological change was observed in the mobile telephony networks
with a gradual upgrading from analogical signal (1G), to GSM or DCS (2G) in the 1990s,
and finally to 3G in the 2000s. In both fixed telephony and mobile telephony segments the
new technologies afforded higher capacities, necessary to accommodate an increasing
demand for services.28 In parallel, the 1990s marked the expansion of the Internet to
constantly higher speeds and bandwidths (from PSTN to ISDN and finally xDSL
technologies). This in turn allowed the parallel transmission of voice and data over
broadband, and the trend towards industry convergence.29 These technological
advancements led to the ‘combined business model’ and specifically, the bundling of
telephony with broadband services (double-play) and also cable TV (triple-play).30
Technological change was considered as one of the primary factors that drove
liberalisation of the telecommunications sector, in addition to the shift in ideologies and
the tighter budgetary constraints.31 More specifically, the ideological shifts since the
1980s altered the traditional conception that telecommunications were a natural
monopoly.32 The first mover was the US, with a speedily reformed telecommunications
market. The US Federal government abolished AT&T’s monopoly and this paved the way
for new entrants such as Sprint. Similarly, the monopoly of British Telecom in Britain
ended in 1984, after the Conservative government gave to Mercury a licence as a public
operator, creating a duopoly.33 The reforms in the US and Britain unleashed a global
dynamic of international ‘regulatory competition’ and ‘competitive emulation’ and the
Europeans decided that liberalisation was unavoidable if they were to retain their
international competitiveness.34
After overcoming disagreements between member-states in the late 1980s, the
European Commission accelerated the implementation of its liberalisation agenda
particularly targeted to dissolving national telecom monopolies.35 A series of Commission
Directives required the abolition of monopolies by 1 January 1998. The opening up of the
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European telecom market was gradual, first targeting specific segments, such as satellite
communications and mobile telephony, until the launch of a full-scale liberalisation in all
telecommunications services.36 Overall, the European telecoms sector was widely
considered as the ‘success story’ of the EU liberalisation programme. The relaxation of
regulation in a wide range of ‘network services’ sectors in Greece and Italy is partly
reflected on the OECD indicator37 that measures product market regulation of non-
manufacturing industries, including telecoms (see Figure 1).
As a consequence of the European liberalisation programme, dozens of incumbent
telecom operators rapidly transformed into world class multinational corporations.38 The
following sections delve deeper into the commonalities and differences between OTE and
TI by examining their responses to liberalisation and their paths towards privatisation and
internationalisation.
Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation (OTE), 1949–2009
Historical background
The internationalisation of telecommunications operators is known to have historical
precedents particularly before the interwar period.39 In Greece, German and British
subsidiaries offered telephony and telegraphy services up until the late 1940s. AETE
(Greek Telephone Company), which was a Siemens subsidiary, provided telephony
services, whereas Eastern Telegraph, which was a subsidiary of the Cable & Wireless,
offered international telegraphy services.40 After the end of the Second World War, the
national communications infrastructure was largely destroyed, and the costs of repairs
were borne out by the US Marshall Plan funds. In 1949, the Greek government decided to
nationalise the above enterprises, merging them into a single one (OTE) and granting
exclusive rights in the provision of telephony and telegraphy.41
In the following decades, the performance of OTE under public ownership was
ambivalent. The expansion of productive capacity was impressive, closely following
developments in technological change. It started with a very low telephone density, but
managed to attain very high rates; and by the end of the 1950s, there were 2.88 telephone
connections per 100 inhabitants, which was the tenth highest density rate in Europe at the
time.42 Additionally, OTE was among the first European operators to automate the
intercity telephone calls in the 1960s, and was the sixth in Europe to launch an antenna of
satellite communications in 1970. The above achievements were due to a rapid expansion
of its network and substantial infrastructure investments stemming from government
funding. Although government funding was favourable on investments for the expansion
and upgrading of the network, there were several inefficiencies that persisted. In the 1990s
successive governments used those exact inefficiencies to make OTE’s privatisation more
palatable.
OTE never fully met customer demand and customer service quality deteriorated as
demand for new telephone connections increased over time.43 By the end of the 1980s, the
waiting time for a new telephone line installation was about 5.5 years.44 The management
of the organisation suffered from excessive government interference and this mirrored the
prevalence of clientelistic practices and the statist character of the Greek model of
capitalism. For instance, on human resources, the personnel selection and recruitment
processes were, more often than not, based on political affiliation criteria, serving the
electoral interests of successive centre-right and socialist governments.45 This led to
overstaffing in OTE reaching a peak of employment at about 30,000 employees in 1986.
On the side of operations management, special government committees in the Ministry of
[AQ27]
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Telecommunications had to approve equipment procurement, adding layers of
bureaucracy and exacerbating delays in the supply of equipment. Finally, on pricing
strategy, the Ministry of Economy co-determined the tariffs jointly with management,
serving the main aim to keep the costs for consumers as low as possible.46
As discussed in the previous section, the ideological shifts at the European level
required the liberalisation of telecom markets. The European Commission’s plans to open
up the telecommunications sectors across Europe prompted the specification of a five-year
development plan (1989–1993) for OTE. To assist the opening up of the sector, the
European Commission, with the agreement of the Greek government, requested from the
UK-based management consultancy, Coopers Lybrand & Deloitte, to conduct a study on
the reform of the Greek telecommunications market.47 The overall aim of the final plan
was to upgrade the existing infrastructure and improve the quality of service by increasing
the telephone density; reducing the waiting lists and waiting times; and increasing the
digitisation of the network.48 This EU impetus was bound to radically transform the Greek
telecoms sector.
Liberalisation
The liberalisation of the sector started with the separation of telecoms’ operation and
regulation. In 1992, the centre-right government, under Prime Minister Konstantinos
Mitsotakis, passed Law 2075/1992 to establish the first independent regulator, the
National Telecommunications Commission. Its actual operation delayed until the summer
of 1995, and even then, the regulatory authority was only focused on the mobile telephony
segment of the market. The new socialist government, under Prime Minister Kostas
Simitis, enacted Law 2668/1998 with the aim to reorganise the postal services sector and
renamed the National Telecommunications Commission (EET) into the National
Telecommunications and Post Commission (henceforth: EETT). A stream of EU
Directives required the revision of the legal framework to achieve compliance. Most
notably, Law 2867/2000 strengthened the supervisory, auditing and regulatory powers of
EETT.
The intensification of competition in OTE’s market appeared with a notable delay.
Although most of the EU member states opened up their telecommunications’ markets by
1st January 1998, the Greek government managed to negotiate with the European
Commission a three-year extension, so that full liberalisation would take place in 2001.49
As in other cases, this slow liberalisation aimed at giving breathing time to the ‘national
champion’ to adjust to the changing circumstances.50 But in the case of OTE, this delay
also meant ‘buying time’ for the government to appease the opposition coming from
within the party and the socialist trade unions. OTE needed the time to prepare for an
environment with high competitive pressures, while the government bought time to slowly
set up the framework and make the privatisation more acceptable.
Since 2001, the independent regulatory authority (EETT) assumed a more active role;
it ensured that OTE did not take advantage of its dominant position. The new entrants
either developed their own network infrastructures or offered services by leasing OTE’s
network.51 OTE’s first competitor was Tellas, which a joint venture between the Greek
Public Power Corporation (DEH) and the Italian WIND. Tellas was able to take advantage
of the electricity network infrastructure to offer fixed telephony services. Additionally,
two major Internet service providers, Forthnet and Hellas On Line, took advantage of their
network infrastructure to offer fixed telephony services. On the other hand, some of the
new entrants included several start-up companies (e.g. Lannet, Telepassport, Teledome,
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Altec Telecoms, and Vivodi), which offered services using the ‘last mile’ of OTE’s
network. Nevertheless, few of them managed to survive the intensity of competition, and
by the late 2000s most of them were either targets of acquisitions by larger players or were
forced to shut down.52
More generally, the regulatory impact of EETT afforded the new players to erode
OTE’s monopoly position. As part of its policy to inject competition in the market, EETT
took a number of measures, for example, introducing number portability to allow easy
switching between providers. Additionally, the regulatory frame became stricter, when
EETT made a significant reduction in OTE’s wholesale charges and applied a price cap on
OTE’s retail tariffs. This led to a move towards cost-reflective pricing with a reduction in
tariffs for international calls and increases in tariffs for local calls.53 From EETT’s
standpoint, the policy sought to prevent OTE from applying price squeeze upon its
competitors.54 As a result, OTE suffered a steady decline in its market share (Figure 2).
Privatisation
The first attempt to privatise OTE took place in 1992. The centre-right government, under
Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis, favoured a privatisation method that entailed a
mix of asset sale and share issuing. The plan was to sell about 35% of OTE to a ‘strategic
investor’ via auction; 10% to the public via share issuing; and another 4% was earmarked
for OTE employees. Following a call for tenders, several global players expressed interest,
including the Japanese NTT, the Spanish Telefo´nica, and France Telecom.55 Despite the
interest, the plan to privatise OTE backfired on the government, as it met fierce resistance
not only from the socialist opposition and the socialist trade union, but also from within
members of the centre-right party. The row over OTE’s privatisation proved to be a
political suicide; the Mitsotakis government lost the slim parliamentary majority and
collapsed in 1993.
Following the October 1993 elections, the new socialist government, under Prime
Minister Andreas Papandreou, abandoned the plans for finding a ‘strategic investor’ for
OTE. Yet the government did not fully forsake the plans for privatisation. Fiscal
consolidation for the entry to the Economic and Monetary Union was considered as
completely unattainable without at least partial privatisations.56 OTE was considered as
one of the gems in the crown of public sector enterprises, and certainly, on the top of the
privatisation list. The socialists followed a much different approach for the privatisation of
OTE than the earlier centre-right government. Instead of asset-sale privatisation (i.e.
transferring a block of shares to a strategic investor) they pursued a more ‘gradualist’
approach of shares issuing. Indeed, the first public offering of OTE shares (6%) took place
in 1996 and the socialist government followed this approach up until 2004. This brought
the state ownership of OTE from 100% in 1995 down to 33.4% in 2004.57 This step-by-
step privatisation reflected the politically contested process of privatisations, and contrasts
sharply with the Italian case, whereby TI was privatised very quickly. The socialists
managed to appease the tensions that the OTE sell-out provoked within the party and the
trade unions in two ways. First, the state remained the ‘controlling interest’ and retained
the ‘golden share’ via Law 2843/2000, which stipulated that state ownership should be no
less than 33.4%. Second, OTE was protected by hostile takeovers via Law 2257/1994,
which imposed a 5% cap on voting rights for private investors, even if they held more than
5% of OTE shares
In 2004 the government changed to the centre-right, under Prime Minister Costas
Caramanlis. The government’s stake increased temporarily to 48.6%, because it exercised
[AQ28]
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an option to convert a bond into shares, and this was followed by public offering of OTE
shares (10%), bringing state ownership again down to 38.7%.58 The government’s tight
control over the company and the cap on minority shareholders’ voting rights, made the
acquisition of OTE by a strategic investor relatively unattractive. For this reason, the
government enacted Law 3522/2006 in December 2006 abolishing the 5% cap on voting
rights and the provision over a minimum level of state ownership, to pave the way for
privatisation.59 In January 2007 the government hired a group of international consultants,
including UBS and Credit Suisse First Boston, to search for strategic investors for OTE.
Despite the institutional changes, the search did not yield any results60, and the
government sold another 10.7% stake to institutional investors, bringing state ownership
down to 28% in June 2007. In August 2007 the government also amended Law 2190/1920
on corporate governance of Public Limited Companies (Socie´te´ Anonyme) by
strengthening the rights of minority shareholders. In particular, the new Law 3604/2007
reduced the required percentage of shares for ‘large’ minority shareholders from 33% to
20% and granted them enhanced rights pertaining to information, auditing, and postponing
or vetoing decisions of the Shareholders’ Meetings.61
This sequence of institutional changes had unintended consequences, unforeseen by
the government. The combination of these reforms gave increased powers to private
investors holding 20% of OTE, and in conjunction with a high exposure of OTE shares in
the stock market, increased OTE’s vulnerability to a hostile takeover. Marfin Investment
Group (MIG), a holdings company with investments in several sectors, seized this
opportunity. MIG started silently buying out OTE shares from the stock market, reaching
gradually a 19.9% of OTE.
The revelation of this slow acquisition led to a public outcry for the government, and
media blamed the government for ‘being caught while sleeping’.62 MIG requested a seat in
the board of directors and expressed an interest in taking over full control of OTE.
It assured OTE employees and the government that its intention was to make a long-term
investment and develop OTE as a ‘national champion’, rather than liquidate it or sell off
some parts.63 Still, the government did not favour such an acquisition. The right-wing
government considered MIG’s interest as highly opportunistic.64
To avoid this hostile takeover, the Minister of Economy, George Alogoskoufis, passed
quickly in December 2007 a law that set an upper 20% limit for the participation of
individual investors in companies of ‘strategic importance’ such as OTE.65 It was clear
that this law was against European competition rules, and could be challenged by the
European Commission. In practice, this bought some time for the government to find a
‘white knight’ and achieve a friendly takeover, and specifically Deutsche Telekom (DT).
Following consultations, the three parties (the government, DT, and MIG) reached a deal.
The deal provided that DT would buy MIG’s 20% stake plus another 3% stake from the
government and 2% from the stock market. DT bought MIG’s 20% stake at 26 euros per
share, which entailed a 36% premium above the market price of 19.14 euros, which was
quoted on the stock exchange at the time.66 By November 2008, DT and the Greek state
each held 25% of the company. DT agreed in this deal under the specific condition that it
would eventually purchase an additional 5% from the government, which would give full
control of OTE and a total of 30% ownership. In July 2009 DT increased the stake to 30%
and state ownership reduced to 20%. This made DT the largest shareholder with rights to
appoint the Chief Executive and to have a majority of seats on the company’s Board.67 DT
was also granted with a ‘right of first refusal’, that is, the contractual right to acquire the
remaining state shares before they can be offered to anyone else. DT exercised this right
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and by the end of March 2012 DT held 40% of OTE. The Greek state’s ownership fell to
10%, retaining some ‘golden share’ veto rights in areas such as national security.
Internationalisation
OTE’s revenues from international sales stood at 0.5% of total sales in 1999, but increased
rapidly to the level of 26% by 2007.68 Although the level of OTE’s internationalisation
was similar to the levels of TI, the path was substantially different. The
internationalisation strategy of OTE focused on becoming one of the major regional
players. As OTE came in rather late in the liberalisation phase, it sought to take advantage
of opportunities to expand its market in the neighbouring countries of South-eastern
Europe (the Balkans). This market-seeking strategy was a critical part of the overall
business strategy of OTE in the post liberalisation era. It is reflected on the statement by
the Managing Director of OTE, Lefteris Antonacopoulos, who insisted that the expected
strong performance of OTE was based on OTE’s entry into ‘South-Eastern Europe, a
telecommunication market of 60 million customers’ that provided ‘significant prospects
for the development of its customer base’.69 This suggests the importance of managers’
role in engaging in the internationalisation strategy that will help to appease
shareholders.70 As the main shareholder of OTE was the state, the strategic focus on
the wider region was thought to maintain Greece as a force of stability that promotes
regional economic development, while at the same time building a ‘national champion’.
The internationalisation process appears to have followed loosely the so-called ‘Uppsala
model’ that emphasises the role of geographical proximity, incremental decision-making,
and learning.71 As the Greek managers were more familiar with the political and economic
context of the neighbouring countries, the expansion of operations in the immediate region
was preferable as a location choice.
Indeed, by 2002, OTE expanded its operations to the emerging markets of South-
Eastern Europe either directly, setting-up subsidiaries, or indirectly, via acquisitions. This
expansion was either in the mobile or fixed telephony segments. OTE’s internationalisa-
tion strategy included the following countries (companies): Albania (Cosmo-holding),
Bulgaria (Globul), Former Yugoslavic Republic of Macedonia (Cosmofon), Romania
(Cosmorom, Romtelecom), Serbia (Telekom Srbija), and Armenia (Armentel).72 This
expansive strategy enhanced the position of OTE as a major player in the region and made
it attractive for the DT acquisition. As we shall see below it proved to be much more
cautious than TI’s strategy. By the end of 2009 the Group’s maintained a balanced
presence in the Balkans, divesting only from Armenia and FYROM.73
Telecom Italia 1960–2009
Historical background
The different concession agreements that were granted to private telephone operators in
the early twentieth century segmented the Italian telecommunications across different
regions. In the 1960s the concession agreements expired, and the telecoms branch (IRI-
STET) of the state-owned IRI holding company (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale)
purchased shares of the regional operators. Thus, the government created a public
monopoly under the name of SIP (Societa` Italiana per l’Esercizio Telefonico).74
Nevertheless, the nationalised company retained a divided organisational structure and the
national territory was divided into the five zones in which the previous five regional
companies operated. This structure contributed to the persistence of inefficiencies, for
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example, bureaucratic relationships within and across management levels; duplicated
tasks and responsibilities; and wasteful human resource practices.75 These organisational
inefficiencies persisted, since there were still different companies in charge of different
parts of the communications infrastructure leading to an excessive institutional
fragmentation.76 Although SIP was mainly responsible for the provision of telecoms
services to households and businesses, Telespazio was responsible for satellite
communications, SIRM for maritime communications, Iritel for public telephone
services, Italcable handled international calls, and ASST dealt with long-distance
(intercity) calls.77 Unlike other telecommunications operators, the nationalisation in Italy
did not lead to a unification of the system’s subsets.
In the early 1980s, two initiatives stood out as responses to the challenge of persisting
inefficiencies. The first was related to intra-firm reorganisation, whereas the second was
oriented to the restructuring of the whole industry. Intra-firm reorganisation in SIP
involved inter alia: abolition of old geographical divisions that corresponded to different
entrepreneurial and technical cultures; changes in work organisation away from
bureaucratic and repetitive jobs towards enlarged job tasks; annualised working hours; and
incentive pay systems for sales staff.78
Additionally, the coalition government under Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini,
formed by the Christian Democrats, the Socialist Party and three minor coalition partners,
attempted the restructuring of the whole sector in the early 1980s. To this end, it
established an expert commission directed by Franco Morganti, an Olivetti engineer and
consultant, to develop recommendations for action.79 The recommendations of the
Committee included the complete liberalisation of the terminal market as well as new
telematic services, but, unlike developments in Britain at the time, the experts defended
the preservation of the public monopoly in the fixed telephony network. The Committee
aimed at ending the fragmentation in the industry, and proposed the consolidation of the
various telecoms organisations (SIP, Telespazio, Italcable, SIRM, Iritel described above)
and integrating them into a single public monopoly, labelled as ‘monopolio intelligente’.80
Notwithstanding, a series of upheavals in Italian politics did not allow the implementation
of any of these proposals.
Liberalisation
The inertia persisted until 1987, when the government established a five-year plan (Piano
Europa) in order to boost competitiveness in the sector and reduce the technological gap
with other European nations.81 In addition to technological developments abroad, the
completion of the Single European Market in 1992 was a recurrent theme that
the governments and managers used to justify the urgent need for institutional reform.82
The Piano Europa was consistent with earlier proposals of the Morganti Committee,
suggesting the integration of the traditionally fragmented system into a ‘super-SIP’ (or
‘super-STET’). The consolidation was thought to be important for two reasons: first, it
would allow the privatisation of the company in the near future; and second, it would
establish a powerful Italian telecoms group, able to compete with other ‘national
champions’ such as British Telecom, DT and France Telecom.83 In 1992 a new law
reorganised SIP through the creation of ‘STET-Telecom Italia’ and a merger between the
different companies followed.84 The single ‘Telecom Italia’ was finally born in 1994.
Following the transposition of the Directives for the opening up of the mobile and
fixed-telephony markets, new players appeared. Starting with mobile telephony, the
Olivetti manufacturing group acquired the first licence and established the Omnitel
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subsidiary in 1995, which began competing with the incumbent’s subsidiary in mobile
telephony (TI Mobile/TIM). The Italian electricity company (ENEL) established WIND
Telecommunicazioni in the late 1990s, while Blu and the Chinese ‘3’ entered the market
soon after. By the early 2000s competitive pressures in the mobile phone segment
appeared strong. The first company to compete with TI in the fixed network was Albacom,
which was established in 1995 and was later acquired by BT Italia. In 1997, the Olivetti
Group established the Infostrada subsidiary, which was later acquired by WIND. In 1999,
Teletu started offering telephony services, until its acquisition by Vodafone in 2010.
AGCOM (Autorita` per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni) was the sector’s
independent regulator authority established by Law 249 in 1997. AGCOM in Italy
steered the competition in the market, just as EETT in Greece. It followed a rather
restrictive tariff policy for TI, allowing new entrants to compete for services using the
‘last mile’ of the fixed network infrastructure and preventing TI from ‘abusing’ its
dominant position.85 Similarly to OTE, TI had to engage into a rebalancing of tariffs
between local, intercity and international calls, so that it complies with the price cap
applied by AGCOM.86
Figure 3 presents the rapid decline in the market share of the TI from 100%
(monopoly) in late 1990s to 65% in the late 2000s and sketches the picture of intensified
competition in the Italian market.
Privatisation
Although the liberalisation was largely guided by the European Commission’s agenda, the
privatisation of TI was on the agenda of successive Italian governments. Both centre-right
and centre-left parties shared the common goal of raising funds so as to reduce the national
debt and eventually join the Economic and Monetary Union.87 For the privatisation of TI,
the centre-left coalition, under Prime Minister Romano Prodi, favoured a mix of asset-sale
and share issuing. In particular, the preferred formula entailed a ‘stable core’ of large
shareholders having an 18% stake, while another 35% was sold via public offering to the
stock exchange.88 Indeed, 35 years after the nationalisation of the 1960s, the state
ownership of TI ended on 20 October 1997, but the government retained some ‘golden
share’ powers. Nonetheless, the shareholders’ core proved to be rather weak and unstable,
since it owned only a 6.62% stake, and this opened the way to the subsequent takeovers.
The first takeover was an initiative led by the Olivetti Group. Although the CEO of TI
at the time, Franco Bernabe`, tried to erect defences against the hostile takeover, these did
not work, partly because the government did not whole-heartedly embrace them. The most
important one was the search for a ‘white knight’; finding a friendly bidder who would
offer a higher bid than the hostile bid led by Olivetti. DT was the main candidate as a
friendly bidder, which was allegedly a ‘problematic’ white knight for the Italian
government, because the German state owned a 72% of DT. The acquisition by DT would
have led to a foreign renationalisation of Italy’s biggest listed company, and this prospect
‘was too much for the Italian government to stomach’.89
Massimo D’Alema, who had become Prime Minister of the centre-left coalition
government in the meantime, entered into negotiations with the German Chancellor
Gerhard Schro¨der. Despite this, the negotiations failed, since Germany was not willing to
privatise DT in the near future, and Massimo D’Alema eventually favoured the Olivetti
solution.90 The government’s preference was that TI would be better to fall onto Italian
hands, rather than the German state. Thus, the hostile takeover of TI by Olivetti was
completed by the end of May 1999.
[AQ29]
FBSH 986106—30/3/2015—MURUGANM—502943—Style 1
10 A. Kornelakis
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
Still, the Olivetti control of TI was not bound to last. The second hostile takeover was
largely a consequence of the first one. The main problem was that Olivetti effectively
bought a company that was five times larger than it was; and achieved this by financing the
acquisition via debt.91 Nonetheless, servicing the debt was not easy and the performance
of TI’s stocks remained unimpressive in the following two years. An alliance between
Pirelli and Benetton seized the opportunity and offered a very lucrative bid for the holding
company (Bell) that controlled TI. Marco Tronchetti Provera, CEO of Pirelli, orchestrated
the hostile takeover and eventually took control of Bell through an elaborate mechanism of
‘Chinese boxes’.92 On 28 July 2001 Pirelli and Benetton acquired Bell and gained the
control of TI 93 and Tronchetti Provera became the CEO of TI up until 2006. Nevertheless,
the huge debt that the holding company incurred made it vulnerable to yet another
takeover. In 2007, a consortium of Italian banks together with the Spanish Telefo´nica,
acquired the holding company through which Pirelli and Benetton retained control of TI.
The Prime Minister Romano Prodi accepted the deal under the condition that ‘Spanish
Telefo´nica will only be a minority shareholder, and the majority of control will remain in
Italian hands’.94 Overall, the government was involved in each occasion, but each hostile
takeover had different implications for shareholders. In 1999 Olivetti acquired TI by
launching a tender offer, which benefited all shareholders, whereas the subsequent
takeovers took place outside of the stock market, by paying a premium only to a small core
of shareholders.95
Internationalisation
The internationalisation strategy that TI followed initially focused on becoming one of
the major global players. TI sought to take advantage of opportunities both in Europe and
overseas. In Europe, the opportunities appeared out of the EU liberalisation programme
with the privatisation of incumbents or opening up of national markets to competition.
The share of TI’s international sales as a percentage of total shares increased from 6% in
1999 to 29% in 2007.96 Apart from Europe, TI seized opportunities in the emerging
markets of Latin America, which offered fertile ground for market-seeking investments.
Indeed, in 2000 the CEO of TI, Roberto Colannino, outlined the Group’s
internationalisation strategy as follows: ‘The expansion of international business is a
key element of our strategic plan. The Group aims to become a global operator in the
wireline, wireless and Internet sectors, in particular in Latin America, Southern Europe
and the Mediterranean Basin’.97
In other words, TI’s internationalisation strategy was much more ambitious in scale
than OTE’s, seeking to tap opportunities not only in European markets, but also expand to
Latin America. The difference in ambition is partly explained by the different size of the
economies and in which the two companies were embedded.98 As TI could rely on a larger
domestic market, this could give potentially better ground to compete with the major
players in the European market such as DT, France Telecom and the Spanish Telefo´nica.
In 2000, TI held stakes in various European countries such as France (9 Telecom Group,
Bouygues Decaux Telecom), San Marino (Intelcom RSM), the Netherlands (BBNeD),
Greece (Stet Hellas), Austria (Telekom Austria Group, Mobilkom Austria), Spain (Auna
Group), Czech Republic (Radiomobil) and Serbia (Telekom Srbija).99 Its overseas
operations were strategically focused on Latin America, holding stakes of companies in
Argentina (Telecom Argentina), Brazil (Brasil Telecom, Maxitel, Tele Nordeste Celular,
Tele Celular Sul), Bolivia (Entel Bolivia Group), Chile (Entel Chile Group), Peru (TIM
Peru), Venezuela (Digitel) and Cuba (Etec S.A.).100
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Since then, the Group’s strategy shifted towards de-internationalisation. Indeed, the
2006 Annual Report already stated that ‘We may not achieve the expected return on our
significant investments and capital expenditures made in our international activities due to
the competitive environments in these markets’ and highlighted the intense competition
both in European and Latin American countries.101 By the end of 2009, TI had sold off
stakes in all European operations (except BBNEd in the Netherlands) and most Latin
American (except for TIM Brasil Group and Telecom Argentina).102 The huge debt that
the company had incurred and the growing competition meant that TI could not keep up
with substantial investments required to expand capacity abroad. TI managers were
compelled to divest most its international operations and focus instead on less capital-
intensive segments such as wireless Internet and mobile telephony. TI also increased
domestic productive capacity, diversified with financial participations in other sectors and
paid higher dividends to its shareholders.103 Finally, the entry of Spanish Telefo´nica meant
that the group’s international strategy had to be realigned so that it does not compete with
one of its major shareholders, as Telefo´nica had also substantial stakes in Latin America.
Discussion and conclusion
The case studies presented here suggested that the convergence pressures from global
technological change and the European market integration were mediated differently in TI
and OTE. These patterns broadly corroborate other works in the literature, which found
that the institutional convergence in regulatory frameworks and technological change, did
not necessarily lead to convergence in business strategies and outcomes.104 Yet the cases
also suggest the specificity of the statist model of capitalism105 in shaping those paths of
adjustment. In a nutshell, the factors that appear to explain the divergent outcomes include
the domestic actors’ interests and preferences, and especially governments and managers.
TI was privatised through one-off sale, whereas the Greek governments followed a
gradualist approach, selling chunks of government shares in the stock market through
public offerings. In both cases, governments retained golden share powers, but the
revenues from the sales were expected to improve the fiscal consolidation process for entry
in the Economic and Monetary Union.106 Furthermore, the regulatory framework allowed
successive hostile takeovers in Italy, however, tempered by the preferences of the
government. The role of the government was even more pronounced in Greece, acting as a
gatekeeper and blocking similar attempts for hostile takeovers. Despite the liberalisation
and privatisation, political intervention continued in both sectors. The two governments
expressed their divergent preferences over the bidder. In Italy, the domestic consortium
with Spanish Telefo´nica was preferred over DT. In Greece, DT was preferred over the
MIG consortium.
Both incumbents reacted to liberalisation with internationalisation that reached similar
levels in international sales, and both governments sought to groom their telecom
operators as ‘national champions’. Yet the strategies and preferences of managers and
governments towards foreign acquisitions differed sharply. In Greece, the government-
appointed managers favoured OTE’s expansion in the neighbouring Balkans, which was
thought to strengthen the political role of Greece as a force of stability in the region. The
historical ties and cultural links with South-eastern Europe also helped to facilitate such a
‘regional’ internationalisation strategy. By contrast, TI appeared more ambitious and
eager to become a global player with operations across Europe (Spain, France, the
Netherlands, Austria) and Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Argentina). But TI’s strategy soon
run out of steam as the political instability in Latin America (e.g. Bolivia’s renationalis-
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ation of Entel) and the fierce competition in European markets threated the expansion of
domestic productive capacity. By contrast, OTE’s strategy proved to be more sustainable
and by the end of the decade, OTE still held most of its international operations in
Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and Serbia.
Overall, domestic actors’ interests and preferences largely explain the divergent paths
and strategies. Rather than a monolithic trend guided by competition and technological
change, the governments’ preference over privatisation and the managers’ choices over
internationalisation strategy shaped the corporate adjustment of the two incumbents in the
post-liberalisation era. Fligstein and Merand suggested that the role of the state is still
important in shaping the direction of change in contemporary capitalism while
‘constructing markets’.107 There is evidence for this in both cases. The influence of the
government was either direct, through government intervention in critical junctures, or
indirect, through changes in the regulatory framework regarding hostile takeovers and
preference over the favoured bidder.
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